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Shocks generate high uncertainty creating the need for firms to search for 
solutions to cope with the changed business landscape. One such response is 
the creation of new partnerships. Yet, do all shocks affect the 
interorganizational responses that follow equally? This article proposes that 
distinguishing between technological and non-technological shocks can be a 
useful lens to look at how interfirm collaboration changes in the face of a 
shock. Using the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks as an illustrative example 
of non-technological shock, the authors describe how it affected collaboration 




Distinguishing between non-technological and technological 
shocks  
The expression “uncertainty is the new normal” is pervasive in our society. 
It reflects the increasing amount of unpredictability that organizations and 
their people deal with on a daily basis. Yet, the majority of this uncertainty 
can be labeled as “comfortable uncertainty” which is a bearable amount of 
unpredictability that managers can cope with without needing to 
significantly alter established routines and practices within their 
organization. This type of uncertainty develops in a relatively linear fashion 
as industries evolve and can be generated by changes in consumer demand 
as a product moves from one stage to another of its life cycle or the 
introduction of an updated version of a pre-existing product. What is 
probably harder for organizations to manage is the uncertainty stemming 
from unforeseen but temporary events of significant magnitude. This less 
predictable form of uncertainty carries higher transformative power as it is 
more difficult to anticipate and industry players have little or no influence on 
it.   
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Radical changes play a significant role in reconfiguring positions of 
leadership and questioning the status quo of established players.1,2 In an 
effort to understand the transformative power of disruptive processes, 
academic research has often focused on a particular type of disruption which 
takes the form of a technological breakthrough and examined its impact on 
firms and industries.3,4 The exploration of these dynamics has also led 
researchers to investigate the factors that shape the interplay between 
incumbents and challengers ultimately dictating who are the winners and the 
losers in the face of a radical innovation.5 For instance, Apple and Google 
have successfully challenged Nokia’s leadership through their new mobile 
operating systems while Netflix was able to defeat Blockbuster by streaming 
video content over the internet. Evidence shows that many industry leaders 
suffer in the face of radical innovations and examples of industries where new 
entrants where able to get significant market shares due to a switch in the 
technological paradigm range from watches, with the transition from 
mechanical to quartz, to portable music with the transition from portable 
cassette and CD players to digital music players.  
Technological shocks generate innovation opportunities but at the same 
time create a great deal of uncertainty. One of the ways through which firms 
respond to the uncertainty generated by a major disruption is by creating 
alliances. These forms of growth are particularly suitable for unsettled times 
as they require less resources compared to organic growth and at the same 
time require less commitment and coordination with respect to mergers and 
acquisitions. The ferment in alliance activity following a major disruption 
will affect the structure of the industry collaboration network in less 
predictable ways than before the shock, ultimately shaping industry 
boundaries. For example, following the rise of the Internet in the early 1990s 
there was a dramatic increase in the number of IT alliances formed which 
continued until the early 2000s. An important feature of significant increases 
or decreases in alliance activity in technology-intensive settings is that they 
act as early signals of a subsequent technological breakthrough.6 
Unfortunately, the predictive power of such shocks does not hold for 
disruptive events that are not related to technology and whose locus is 
exogenous to an industry. Examples of non-technological events include 
natural disasters, a sudden financial recession, wars, pandemics, and terrorist 
attacks. As comprehensive as these findings may be in providing insights on 
collaborative dynamics, they may present a truncated understanding of the 
issues related to situations far from equilibrium that are not directly related 
to technology-driven disruptions. Another viewpoint to the question of how 
interfirm collaboration evolves and for which reasons could be that of 
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exploring how exogenous and non-technology related events dictate the 
speed and the nature of collaboration within a specific industry. 
  
The link between non-technological shocks and interfirm 
collaboration 
As industries reach their maturity stage, it becomes easier to identify 
which actors occupy more prominent positions and which ones are more at 
the margins of an industry. From time to time, however, such equilibrium is 
punctuated by a sudden and unexpected event (e.g., financial crises, natural 
disasters, and industrial accidents) that, depending on its magnitude and 
duration, can partly or totally alter the pre-existing order. These events act 
as an occasion for change opening up opportunities otherwise difficult to 
obtain. One such occasion is provided by the chance that industry actors 
have following a shock to modify their position in the industry network 
through partnerships or acquisitions. Put differently, although managers 
cannot anticipate when the shock will take place and how big its effect will 
be, they can exert influence on how their firms will adapt to it. Understanding 
which solutions are more effective in the face of an exogenous event is a 
fundamental undertaking for those firms aspiring to gain positional 
advantages in such moments of transition.  
When designing their alliance networks, alliance managers may consider 
several dimensions that include one-to-one partnerships (i.e., their direct 
bilateral ties), clusters consisting of mutual agreements among few players 
and the overall network in which they are embedded. Because alliance 
networks evolve in a linear and predictable fashion, it is likely that firms with 
many alliances already in place will tend to attract a considerably higher 
amount of new partners compared to competitors having a smaller number 
of partners. Moreover, partners sharing similar attributes will be more likely 
to form alliances such that, in principle, it would be easier for a firm with 
high, rather than low, reputation to form an alliance with another highly 
reputed firm. At the intersection between dyadic relationships and the 
overall industry network, we can consider subsets of actors and the possible 
ties among them. Thus, when structuring their alliance portfolios, alliance 
managers may consider the amount of indirect partnerships (i.e., their 
partners’ partners) turning into direct ones, a phenomenon known as triadic 
closure. The position the company will occupy in the industry network will 
thus be a byproduct of the dimensions described above. Because alliance 
portfolios are often the result of a “sedimentary” accumulation process, it 
may be only when firms experience a severe rupture in the system that new 
scenarios may come into existence. Observation of this phenomenon raises a 
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simple yet puzzling question. How does a non-technological shock affect 
alliance activity?  
 
How collaboration changes following a non-technological shock 
A widely accepted example of non-technological shock is provided by the 
September 11, 2001 (i.e., 9/11) terrorist attacks. On that day, the world 
witnessed one of the worst tragedies as two planes flew into the towers of the 
World Trade Centre in the city of New York killing more than three thousand 
people. Many industries were directly affected by the disaster including 
airline, insurance and agriculture and food.7 With respect to air transport, 
the effect of the crisis that followed led few prominent airlines (e.g., TWA in 
North America and Sabena in Europe) to discontinue operations and many 
others to adopt strict cost-cutting measures. In this scenario, the need for 
collaboration became more felt than usual resulting in an increased amount 
of one-to-one partnerships (which typically take the form of code-sharing 
agreements between airlines) and adherence to multilateral alliances. The 
latter take the form of airline groupings were members share not only their 
codes but often recognize their frequent flyer programs, share same spaces 
at airport terminals and conduct joint marketing activities. The amount of 
airlines joining one of the three multilateral alliances (i.e., oneworld, 
SkyTeam, and Star Alliance) increased by 25% between 2002 and 2005.  
Building new relationships brings benefits such as additional customers 
or entry into new markets but at the same time raises the complexity and the 
costs of managing a wider alliance portfolio. Hence, unless necessary, an 
increase of the alliance portfolio will be a very gradual and slow process. In a 
study using the airline industry as the empirical setting, Corbo and his 
associates used several diagnostic indicators to explore if and how airlines 
collaborated differently in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.8 Not only the study 
confirmed that airlines were more inclined to form partnerships in the 
aftermath of the shock, but the changes in partnering behavior led to a 
change in the overall industry network structure. Such changes included an 
increase in the amount of partnerships between diverse airlines, suggesting 
that complementarity acquires more value in times of crisis, and an increase 
in the amount of partnerships forged by more marginal airlines, indicating 
that non-technological shocks act as structure-loosening events.9 Overall, 
these results suggest the need for a more explorative behavior on the part of 
the actors hit by the shock which confirms the general finding that periods 
of high uncertainty require a more entrepreneurial posture.10 However, this 
tendency was mitigated by a simultaneous increase in clustering in the post-
9/11 period which is indicative of a tendency towards consolidation of existing 
ties.  
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The empirical findings of the study summarized above provide a tentative 
answer to the question of how collaboration changes in the face of a non-
technological shock. In the context of the airline industry, firms responded 
to the negative shock by pursuing a mix of explorative – seeking highly 
diverse partners – and exploitative ties – forging alliances with partners’ 
partners – therefore morphing the industry network into a hybrid one. What 
is particularly significant is that this transformation was not temporary and 
limited to the immediate aftermath of the shock but persisted in the longer 
term. One conclusion that can be drawn is that changes provoked by non-
technological shocks such as wars, terrorist attacks or natural disasters 
affecting partnering behavior and network structure differ from the ones 
generated by technology shocks. The effects of the latter often tend to affect 
firms and their networks temporarily before equilibrium is re-established. 
For instance, Romanelli & Tushman showed that most firms accomplish 
profound change within two years.11 One possible explanation for the slower-
paced changes taking place following a non-technological shock could be 
attributed to the higher cognitive effort that managers need to make sense of 
such unforeseen shocks. Accordingly, a higher amount of time will be needed 
for resilience strategies to be implemented but, once these changes are put 
in place, their effects are likely to endure possibly until a new major non-
technological shock takes place. 
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